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GENERALIZING DISABLITY 
Michael Ashley Stein* 
PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES. By Frederick Schauer. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 359. $29.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Published in 1949, Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek's article 
The Equal Protection of the Laws1 has exerted longstanding influence on 
subsequent Fourteenth Amendment scholarship.2 Insightfully, Tussman 
and tenBroek identified a paradox: although the very notion of equality 
jurisprudence is a "pledge of the protection of equal laws," laws 
themselves frequently classify individuals, and "the very idea of 
classification is that of inequality."3 Notably, classification raises two 
sometimes concurrent varieties of inequality: over-inclusiveness and 
under-inclusiveness. Of these, over-inclusiveness is a more egregious 
equal protection violation due to its ability to "reach out to the innocent 
bystander, the hapless victim of circumstance or association."4 
Despite this shortcoming of classification, Tussman and tenBroek 
objected to the process of classification only where the categories were 
either empirically unsustainable or based on legally proscribed 
characteristics.5 The use of classification as a method of administrating 
* Associate Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law 
School and Visiting Fellow, Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (Spring 2004-
Spring 2005); Ph.D. 1998, Cambridge; J.D. 1988, Harvard.- Ed. I thank Neal Devins, Mark 
Kelman, and Sanford Levinson for sharing their thoughts; Andrew Teel and law librarian 
Christopher Byrne for their research assistance; and Penelope Stein for her constant 
support. My research was funded by an American Counsel of Learned Societies Andrew W. 
Mellon Fellowship. 
This review is dedicated to the memory of Hugh Gregory Gallagher, accomplished 
disability rights activist (responsible for the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, the first 
major civil rights legislation for people with disabilities), and disability historian (author of 
FDR's SPLENDID DECEPTION, an account of how the president successfully hid his 
wheelchair use). Hugh was a kind, wise, and joyful friend, and is greatly missed. 
1. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. 
REV. 341 (1949). 
2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 751 (1996), for instance, ranked the Tussman & tenBroek article as the fourteenth 
most cited law review article of all time. 
3. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 344. 
4. /d. at 351. 
5. /d. passim. 
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policy was not itself opposed by the authors, both of whom were 
distinguished civil libertarians.6 According to Frederick Schauer's 
Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes ("Profiles")/ this broad and 
appropriate acceptance of classification is in stark contrast to current 
mores, where decisions based on categories and generalizations -what 
Tussman and tenBroek called classifications- are frequently denigrated 
as stereotyping, or, even worse, profiling. In response to this now-
prevalent sensibility, Schauer defends the morality of using 
generalizations as a means of mediating modern-day life. He further 
argues that the use of classifications is inevitable and can also be 
desirable. 
Part I of this Review sets forth Schauer's definitions, theses, and 
conclusions. Next, Part II critiques some of the assertions presented in 
Profiles. Finally, Part III extrapolates Schauer's analytical framework on 
generalizations to employment discrimination under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),8 an area not addressed in the book. 
I. GENERALLY SPEAKING, GENERALITIES WORK 
Profiles defends the morality of decisionmaking based on 
generalizations against a contemporary inclination to equate such 
decisionmaking with the unseemly practices of stereotyping and 
profiling. Moreover, Schauer argues that determinations based on 
categories are both inevitable and useful. 
As a definitional matter, Profiles divides generalizations between 
spurious categories lacking statistical support and nonspurious 
categories that are empirically sustainable. The nonspurious category 
contains two further varieties: universal generalizations that are 
always true because of either definitional ("all bachelors are 
unmarried") or empirical ("all humans are less than nine feet tall") 
reasons, and those generalizations that are relatively truer for 
members of a particular group than they are in general ("bulldogs 
tend to have poorer hips than most other dogs," or "teenagers are 
relatively bad drivers in comparison to the overall driving 
population") (pp. 7-19). It is this last category, in which decisions are 
6. Both were progressive educators at the University of California, Berkeley. Among 
their many respective accomplishments, Tussman was a constitutional philosopher whose 
best known academic contribution is THE SUPREME COURT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
(Joseph Tussman ed., 1963); tenBroek was a professor of political science, and also founded 
the National Federation of the Blind, an organization over which he presided for twenty-
eight years. THE ABC-CLIO COMPANION TO THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 303-04 
(Fred Pelka ed., 1997). 
7. Frederick Shauer is the Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
8. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12,111-12,117 (2000). 
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based on largely accurate proxies, where Schauer focuses most of his 
attention and that he defends on pragmatic grounds. 
Initially, Profiles supports generalizations as "an unavoidable 
feature of our decision-making existence" (p. 76). This is because we 
live in a complex society where people simply cannot conduct an in-
depth and individualized analysis prior to every decision they make (pp. 
75-78). Consequently, Schauer asserts that we utilize generalizations as 
heuristics on a daily basis, whether in determining that flying from 
Boston to New York is faster than taking the train or in believing that 
Ford cars and Hotpoint refrigerators are sound products (p. 76). 
Accordingly, even assessments we think are individualized are not 
always so (pp. 101-07). He further notes that sustainable generalizations 
form the bases for valid and rarely contested determinations in a number 
of areas (pp. 1-6). The Internal Revenue Service, to cite one example, 
effectively uses a "discriminant function" score to sort through 
millions of annual tax returns and identify certain criteria that, on the 
whole, are more likely to be associated with dishonest filing practices. 
These include the underreporting of income among cash-paid 
occupations like waitpersons and taxi drivers and the overly aggressive 
assertion of charitable and tax shelter deductions by physicians and 
lawyers (pp. 160-67). Even more prevalent are practices used by 
insurance actuaries who, every day, apply generalizations as to life 
expectancy, driving ability, neighborhood safety, and the extent of 
related risks to person and property (pp. 4-6). 
Nevertheless, because of a deep-seated Western cultural bias in 
favor of particularity, Schauer maintains that generalizations have 
developed a bad reputation and are therefore disparaged as 
stereotypes, or even worse, as profiling (pp. 1-3, 15-19). In making this 
point, Profiles illustrates the way generalizations have been treated in 
the past. For instance, the Eleatic Stranger from Plato's The Statesman 
recognizes the impracticality of tailoring a general rule to each 
individual. At the same time, however, he states that it would be 
immoral as well as a "disgrace" not to individualize that general rule 
whenever possible (pp. 27-41).9 In a similar vein, Aristotle concluded 
that an equitable solution should always follow when legal 
generalizations produce unfair results (pp. 41-48). This concern with 
individualized justice as a necessary corrective to broadly based 
decisions motivated the practice of Equity in Western jurisprudence 
from its inception in Roman law through the role of the Chancery in 
England (pp. 48-54). Perhaps the most damning assessment of 
generalizations was made by William Blake, who averred that "to 
9. The subject under discussion was a training regime established by a personal trainer 
for his student to follow in his absence. Pp. 27-41. 
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generalize is to be an idiot. To particularize is the alone distinction of 
merit."10 
To Schauer, this negative estimation of decisionmaking based on 
empirically sustainable classifications is unjustified for three main 
reasons. First, nonspurious generalizations are frequently as accurate 
as individualized analyses. Second, the use of statistically valid 
generalizations is more efficient than particularized assessments. 
Third, because of the accuracy and efficiency advantage to 
generalizations, decisions arising through a generalized process are 
widely perceived of as having greater uniformity and fairness. 
Profiles first asserts, as a general premise, that using sustainable 
generalizations often produces results at least as accurate as those 
arising from individualized analyses. This is chiefly because 
particularized assessments rely on individuals using idiosyncratic 
judgment to weight and exclude factors, and thus are often statistically 
less accurate relative to actuarial assessments (pp. 92-101). 
Consequently, Schauer asserts that in a number of contexts, including 
predicting criminal-recidivism rates, a formulaic look at relevant 
factors is a better predictor than an individual determination (pp. 92-
101). Even Equity itself was arbitrary and unpredictable and so 
necessarily reverted to more rule-based processes (pp. 48-54).11 Hence, 
according to Schauer, cultural or historic pining for individual 
decisionmaking as a source of greater justice may be misplaced. 
Secondly, Profiles avers that relying on statistically valid categories 
in the decisionmaking process is more efficient than utilizing 
particularized assessments. Schauer illustrates this argument by citing 
the example of uniform age-based exclusion (pp. 118-21). Some 
drivers who are over the maximum allowable driving age would be 
perfectly safe drivers, just as some individuals not yet entitled to vote 
or drink would do so responsibly (pp. 118-21 ). Although using 
categories will inevitably lead to both over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness, he avers that testing the particular abilities of each 
individual covered by these rules, such as eighty-year-old drivers or 
10. P. 20 (alteration of capitalization without indication in original) (quoting WILLIAM 
BLAKE, Blake's Marginalia, in BLAKE'S POETRY AND DESIGNS 429, 440 (Mary Lynn 
Johnson & John E. Grant eds., 1979). Other cultural references include the philosopher, 
Baroness O'Neill, and the author, Thomas Hardy. See pp. 20, 303 n.14 (citing Onora O'Neill, 
Theories of Justice, Traditions of Virtue, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 61 
(Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992); THOMAS HARDY, TESS OF THE 
D'URBERVILLES 361 (1999)). 
11. In support, Profiles quotes Lord Selden's famous remark that "equity is a roguish 
thing. For law we have a measure ... Equity is according to the conscious of him that is 
Chancellor, and as that is longer or narrower so is equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make 
the standard for the measure a Chancellor's foot." P. 53 (omission and alteration to 
capitalization without indication in original) (quoting TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 
(Frederick Pollock ed., 1927) ). 
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fifteen-year-old imbibers, would be prohibitively expensiveY The key 
to the justness of these rules, Schauer maintains, is not that they limn 
perfectly accurate categories, but rather that on the whole they are 
statistically sustaihable and not arbitrary (pp.121-26). 
As a consequence of the greater accuracy and efficiency obtained 
through the use of classifications, Profiles argues that people perceive 
decisions based on generalizations as more uniform and fair. A 
paradigmatic example of uniformity is application of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") to determine the length of a 
criminal's jail time through a quantitative formula.U Although some 
judges have railed against the Guidelines for constraining their 
individual discretion, 14 Schauer asserts that the Guidelines may 
promote fewer mistakes exactly because of this limitation. Moreover, 
when general rules, especially legal rules, are applied evenly to 
everyone they create a perception of fairness. 15 In other words, 
uniform Guidelines ensure that those who come before a judge 
receive equal treatment and perceive that treatment as fair (pp. 
260-61). 
Finally, because Profiles is not procrustean (even though it does 
affirm that there is something that might be said in favor of 
Procrustes), 16 two broad exceptions are made from a uniform 
application of generalizations. First, Profiles repeatedly contrasts its 
12. This is because information itself costs something to acquire. As such, real-world 
results differ from those academic economists observe under a perfect-competition 
framework where information is free. See generally Christopher K. Braun, A Semiotics of 
Economics, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 435,443 (Robin 
Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995) ("[I]n classical economics, the market 
actors are viewed as having access to perfect information. All parties understand the benefits 
and detriments of the bargain and neither is under compulsion or duress."). 
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL. (West 2003). 
14. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, The Umpires Strike Back, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, 
Mar. 2004, at 15 (compiling complaints by notable judges against their discretion being 
shackled); Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law As Infringing On Judges, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14 (reporting William Rehnquist's complaints against the 
Guidelines); Mark Hamblett, Judge Takes Aim at Congress In Sentencing U.N. Shooter, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 23, 2003, at 4 (detailing how Southern District Judge Robert 
P. Patterson denounced the Guidelines and protested their application by issuing a lower 
sentence). 
15. Uniformity through generalization also promotes the concept of community. 
Specifically, Schauer links generality and community by asserting that communities can only 
exist insofar as each member gives up a certain amount of individualized treatment. Pp. 284-
91. 
16. Hence the chapter heading "Two Cheers for Procrustes." The limited approbation 
balances out the particularistic condemnation of the mythic robber. Thus, 
[I]f, rather than stretching or removing body parts, Procrustes had simply said that all guests 
would be fed the same amount, regardless of size, age, or appetite, or if he had mandated 
that all guests would have to sleep in the same bed regardless of height or heft, we could 
more directly replay many of the traditional debates about equality. 
P. 222. 
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advocacy on behalf of empirically sustainable generalizations with its 
disapproval of spurious categories. For example, Schauer reveals how 
racial profiling is an egregious example of an unfounded 
categorization (pp. 175-98) by describing how O'Hare Airport workers 
subjected African-American women to unnecessary and degrading 
strip searches (pp. 176-79). He demonstrates further that excluding 
race as a factor when making safety determinations at airports would 
lead to equally effective results (pp. 186-87). Any possible offset in 
accuracy could be made up for by a small amount of added inspection 
time (p. 190). The same is true for "DWB," or "driving while black" 
(pp. 191-98)Y Second, within the context of sustainable categories, 
Schauer suggests that there may sometimes be good reasons for going 
against the jurisprudential grain of "treating like cases alike,"18 to 
instead treat unlike cases as alike (pp. 199-223). He proffers gender as 
one example, explaining that discriminators cite gender differences as 
a justification for their actions despite the fact that those differences 
are frequently themselves the product of past discrimination (pp. 138-
41). Moreover, nonspurious gender classifications have been overused 
(pp. 138-41). In consequence, Schauer asserts that circumstances exist 
where the law should choose to remedy historical overuse by choosing 
not to utilize gender as a category (pp. 141-44). 
II. BEING MORE PARTICULAR 
Profiles is a delightful, well-written book that is stimulating to 
legally trained readers and also accessible to lay ones. This is in large 
part due to Schauer's frequent use of entertaining and accurate 
hypothetical examples.19 It is also evident when reading Profiles that 
the author had a good deal of fun when writing, which always bodes 
well for an enjoyable reading experience.20 
17. See generally R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal 
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001). For state-wide studies of 
this phenomenon, see DWIGHT STEWARD, STEWARD RESEARCH GROUP, RACIAL 
PROFILING (2004), available at http://www.protex.org/criminaljustice/police_accountability/ 
RPreportFinal.pdf (Texas); Press Release, Data Collection Resource Center, IRJ Releases 
Preliminary Numbers in Massachusetts Racial and Gender Profiling Study, Jan. 20, 2004, at 
http://www.racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/article.php?article_type=spotlights&article_id=76 
3 (Massachusetts); North Carolina Center for Crime and Justice Research, The North 
Carolina Highway Traffic Study, at http://www.chass.ncsu.edu/justice/reports/hwy_traffic_ 
study_03.htm (2003) (North Carolina). 
18. For perhaps the earliest exposition of this theory, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS § l131a-b, at 118 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (professing that "[t]hings that are 
alike should be treated alike"). 
19. To cite only the Introduction, Schauer asks, among other things, whether: Swiss 
cheese has holes, Capricorns are self-confident, teenagers are dangerous drivers, English 
soccer fans are violent, bulldogs have bad hips, and Volvos are reliable. Pp. 1-19. 
20. This is especially apparent when discussing the virtues and vices of pit-bull 
generalizations. Pp. 55-78. 
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More significantly, Schauer contributes to the antidiscrimination 
literature by advocating for the inevitability and desirability of using 
non-spurious generalizations. His arguments that as individuals we 
need to employ generalizations to both understand others and to 
function in an increasingly complex society are well taken. Moreover, 
these points are infrequently voiced by legal academics21 who by and 
large follow a societal norm disfavoring the use of generalizations to 
mediate social realities.22 As such, Profiles constructively reminds 
those engaged in academic advocacy that intellectual tools - whether 
employing classifications,23 economic analysis,24 or non-mainstream 
prudence25 - are no more than content-neutral devices that can be 
applied in different settings and to different ends. 
Profiles falls a bit short in its - ironically enough - occasional 
lack of particularity, meaning that a bit more elaboration would have 
been helpful in bolstering some of Schauer's arguments. For example, 
he correctly notes that one of the dangers of particularity, insofar as 
individualized decisionmaking is concerned, is that an adjudicator can 
too heavily weight one consideration among several when trying to 
reach a just decision, and thereby render a judgment that is inaccurate 
or unjust (pp. 48-54, 266-74). By contrast, so long as the metric for 
generalization is rational (for instance, requiring pilots to retire at 
21. For an exception, see Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564,572-73 (1998) ("We routinely and necessarily 
make decisions on the basis of generalizations about various characteristics of the people we 
meet. Indeed, conducting the interactions that make up our Jives would be an overwhelming 
and unmanageable task without the ability to do exactly this."). 
22. Although not specifically referenced by Schauer, this aversion to classification is 
especially strong among those scholars averring that generalizations manifest an unconscious 
bias towards biologically atypical individuals. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1995) (exploring prejudice as "systematic biases 
in intergroup judgment"); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that racism is a 
persistent phenomenon even when not intended or realized). For application of these 
concepts to the area of disability, see Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social 
Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002). 
23. A thoughtful and provocative treatment is Mark Kelman, Concepts of 
Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991). Kelman 
argues that federal discrimination Jaw is conceptually too narrow to capture what he avers 
are four distinct types of discrimination arising from the use of standardized employment 
tests. /d. He further maintains that the distinctions utilized in the employment discrimination 
context are "unprincipled" because they are grounded in empirically unsubstantiated 
assumptions. /d. 
24. For two strong objections to the moral validity of employing cost-benefit analysis, 
see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1007-08 (2000), and Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity 
of the Cost-Benefit Standard, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 135 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001). 
25. For instance, the use of critical-race, feminist, disability, or queer-theory 
perspectives. 
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some uniform age between fifty-eight and sixty-two) as opposed to 
arbitrary (e.g., mandating retirement at, say, twenty-five or at ninety), 
the efficiency gained from a uniform rule can outweigh the 
disadvantages to those individuals for whom greater justice might be 
achieved under a regime of case-by-case determination (p. 166). 
The first difficulty with Schauer's assertion is that it does not 
sufficiently engage the counter-argument that choosing one rule over 
another, even within a range of rational rules, can also result in 
inaccurate or unjust decisions. Specifically, Profiles does not elaborate 
enough on just how a policy maker is to weigh efficiency on the one 
hand with justice on the other when drawing lines. Similarly, the book 
could be more forthcoming on how statistically accurate a 
generalization needs to be in order to justify its licit deployment (i.e., 
when it matters that pilots retire at one particular age rather than 
another, even within the range of fifty-eight to sixty-two). The same 
insufficiency also occurs when Schauer makes some other worthy 
points along the way, for instance, his explanation for why our culture 
accepts the use of generalizations in some contexts and not in others 
(pp. 15-19). In the end, I believe that Schauer is by and large correct in 
his overall assertions, but that Profiles would have benefited from a 
fuller treatment of certain key issues.26 
Moreover, Profiles would have benefited its readers by providing 
more normative content. Schauer is right when noting that there are 
instances of statistically sustainable generalizations that exclude 
members of particular groups. He offers two telling examples: the 
higher propensity of women of Jewish-European descent to contract 
breast cancer and thus be excluded from insurance coverage (pp. 34-
40), and the predilection of English soccer fans to engage in violent 
post-match behavior (pp. 37-40). In the first case, Profiles notes that 
these peoples' identities, as women and as Jews, may be sufficiently 
morally relevant to compel decisionmakers to ignore empirically 
verifiable evidence and bear unequal costs. Contrast this to an equally 
- or perhaps even more - verifiable circumstance of the presence of 
English soccer hooligans leading to violenceY Yet the fact that they 
26. Similarly, a point that is not made in Profiles, but which would have bolstered 
Schauer's arguments is that the same individuals who oppose generalizations as harmful to 
an antidiscrimination agenda at times favor their use when they forward this agenda. A 
classic example are the generalizations utilized by plaintiffs bringing disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact litigation. See generally MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 484-510 (5th ed. 2000). As one 
commentator aptly put it, "antidiscrimination law aims at a wholesale, not a retail, injustice." 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 831 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, "Rational 
Discrimination"]. 
27. Only a few diseases can be verified as having been caused by genetic anomalies with 
a 100% expression, meaning that the presence of particular genes invariably manifests in the 
development of the associated disease. See ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
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are English soccer hooligans does not compel a moral decision to 
eschew an empirically sustainable action (p. 39). Schauer provides 
sufficient clues for a reader to infer that the difference lies in whether 
the group has historically been subject to prejudicial treatment (pp. 
138-44). This is a standard line of argument within the 
antidiscrimination literature by those who advocate the use of 
regulation as a means of remedying social exclusion,28 and is certainly 
known to an august constitutional scholar like Schauer,29 but it is not 
made explicit in Profiles. Nor does Schauer provide normative 
guidance for how and where lines might be drawn in making these 
determinations. This might be because Schauer wanted to frame his 
argument broadly rather than limit it to discussions of group-based 
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, because Profiles is otherwise such a 
thoughtful treatment of generalizations and their use, and because 
legal commentators continue to wrestle with the issue of the proper 
constraint of antidiscrimination measures, these are unfortunate gaps. 
III. DISABILITY AND CLASSIFICATION 
Conventional wisdom on the ADA's disability-based reasonable-
accommodation mandates holds that providing an accommodation 
incurs a greater cost than not doing so. Further, and more trenchantly, 
legal scholars assert that accommodating workers with disabilities 
under the ADA is theoretically and ethically distinct from conferring 
remedies under previous civil rights legislation. Building on the 
analytical framework sketched out in Profiles on the use of sustainable 
categories, this Part argues the imperative of treating disability-related 
HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 59-115 (Lori B. Andrews et a!. eds., 1994). In the case of 
"defective" mutations of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene associated with breast or ovarian 
cancer, approximately 50% to 60% of women who inherit those genes will actually develop 
cancer during their lifetimes. See Elizabeth B. Claus et a!., The Genetic Attributable Risk of 
Breast and Ovarian Cancer, 77 CANCER 2318 (1996). For an exploration of the misuse of 
correlative statistics, the harm it causes, and a proposal for ameliorating this problem, see 
Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic 
Discrimination, 55 V AND. L. REV. 1341 (2002). 
28. E.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 
235, 260-61 (1971). For a discussion within the context of antidiscrimination protection for 
people with disabilities, see Mark Kelman, Does Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND 
INSTITUTIONS 91 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kelman, 
Disability Status]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. 
REV. 397,422-68 (2000). 
29. His publications include: AMENDING THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A CONSTITUTION 
(1994); CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999); FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM 
(2000); THE SPEECH-lNG OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (2000). 
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accommodation on a moral level with corrective measures engendered 
by longer established antidiscrimination statutes.30 
A. The Received Wisdom on the Disability Classification 
Since the ADA's passage, a near-consensus of legal academics have 
asserted that the statute's reasonable-accommodation mandates 
qualitatively distinguish the ADA from better ensconced 
antidiscrimination measures, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 ("Title VII").31 In sum, these commentators maintain that 
"real anti-discrimination law[s]" remedy the wrongful exclusion of 
similarly situated members of protected categories from workplace 
opportunity and thereby bring about equality for certain historically 
marginalized groups.32 By contrast, in requiring employers to 
affirmatively provide workplace accommodations to people with 
disabilities, the ADA does more than eliminate discrimination. Instead, 
forcing employers to accommodate those workers pushes the workplace 
equilibrium and its financial calculus beyond equality.33 
This paradigm of employment discrimination, which is so pervasive 
that Christine Jolls terms it "canonical," is economic in nature.34 Its 
clearest proponent is Mark Kelman, who distinguishes between 
regulations preventing "simple discrimination" and those mandating 
"redistribution."35 Simple discrimination arises when an employer 
treats an individual differently from her peers, despite the fact that she 
is equal as far as any "relevant" characteristic.36 A relevant 
characteristic, according to Kelman, is a factor that does not affect that 
30. For further exploration of these issues, see Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, 
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV._ 
(forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Stein, Same Struggle]. 
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000) (barring employment discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin). 
32. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, f.07 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.). 
33. An exhaustive list of legal commentators buying into this notion is provided in 
Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," supra note 26,827 n.3. 
34. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643, 
643-44 (2001 ). 
35. MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 195-226 (1997); Kelman, 
Disability Status, supra note 28; Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. 
L. REv. 833, 877-89 (2001) [hereinafter Kelman, Market Discrimination]; see also MARK 
KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE? THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION AND TAXATION 
8-9 (1999). 
36. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 840; see also Kelman, Disability 
Status, supra note 28, at 93 ("Insofar as the employer or owner cares about the person's 
status or traits that are irrelevant to such person's economic function, he or she is breaching 
the duty to avoid simple discrimination."). 
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employee's net marginal product.37 Consequently, individuals 
countering practices of simple discrimination are asking only that 
employers treat them the same as their peers who are "equivalent 
sources of money."38 In sharp contrast, a disabled employee requesting 
accommodation by definition "concedes" her lower net productivity 
relative to that of a non-requesting employee as a result of 
accommodation costs.39 In consequence, this worker is effectively 
making a "straightforward demand for resource redistribution."40 To 
Kelman, an employer that is required through the ADA to provide an 
accommodation has therefore been subjected to "an implicit 
'regulatory tax'" whose proceeds provide in-kind (as opposed to in-
cash) benefits to accommodation recipients.41 
Moreover, as explained by Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson, 
providing accommodations to disabled workers under the ADA brings 
about a dynamic that goes beyond equality.42 Title VII, they aver, was 
predicated on the idea that certain groups preferred higher paying, 
safer jobs, but were excluded by discriminatory barriers from 
obtaining those jobs.43 By contrast, accommodation requests are 
unrelated to simple discrimination, and the ADA "does not attempt, 
even as a formal matter" to ground itself in an anti-subjugation 
37. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 841-42; see also KELMAN & 
LESTER, supra note 35, at 199-208 (maintaining that employers are chiefly concerned with 
individual net productivity rather than with aggregate gross-production values); Mark 
Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REv. 
1158, 1198-1204 (1991) (same). 
38. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 835. 
39. /d. at 843. Thus, she "does not claim to merit the treatment she asks for because she 
has the same relevant traits as the person who" was not accommodated. /d. But see Ron 
Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, J. Soc. PHIL., Spring 1992, at 113 
("Someone whose disadvantage occurs as a result of a social decision has a more obvious 
claim for social remediation."). 
40. Kelman, Market Discrimination, supra note 35, at 880. 
41. /d. Kelman further distinguishes between simple discrimination and accommodation 
by explaining that the former invokes an unlimited-cost qualified duty, while the latter must 
compete against all other demands for available social resources. Finally, Kelman 
distinguishes the two norms on the ground that the non-accomrnodator bases his decision on 
retaining real social resources (i.e., acting in an economically rational manner) rather than 
on personal preferences (meaning idiosyncratic or illegitimate motivations). /d. at 852-54. At 
the same time, it should be noted that Kelman has consistently pointed out that employers 
frequently believe they are dealing with disabled employees whose traits make them less 
net-productive, when in fact those workers would be equally net-productive but-for the non-
inclusive organizational decisions made by those same employers. See, e.g., id. at 846-48, 877-
78 n. 71. 
42. Samuel I~sacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination With a Difference: Can 
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001). For a farther-reaching application of Kelman's thesis, see Samuel 
Issacharoff, Bearing the Costs, 53 STAN. L. REv. 519 (2000). 
43. Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 42, at 313. 
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command.44 Accordingly, while traditional antidiscrimination 
provisions remedy past prejudice, the ADA "eschews this formal 
equality command" and instead seeks to raise the disabled to a 
position that is more than equal.45 
B. The Subordination Exception to Generalization 
Recall that in appraising the use of generalizations, Profiles 
distinguishes between spurious and nonspurious categories. 
Additionally, Schauer notes that nonspurious classifications contain 
both universal generalizations that are always true, and 
generalizations that are relatively more accurate for members of a 
particular group than for the public at large. Profiles defends the 
morality of making decisions based on this last category, except in 
circumstances when the empirical data upon which the decision maker 
relies is itself the result of prior discriminatory practice. Although 
Schauer does not sufficiently elaborate the normative basis for this 
exemption from the general use of sustainable classifications, the 
arguments he makes in Profiles reflects a well-known body of 
academic literature when setting forth a subordination exception to 
generalization. 
From an empirical perspective, the accuracy of the generalization 
about accommodated workers with disabilities being relatively more 
expensive is uncertain. Nevertheless, because I have addressed this 
topic at length elsewhere,46 and in order to engage the strongest 
argument put forth by these scholars, let us assume that this 
generalization is nonspurious, and also universally true. The key 
question then becomes whether from an ethical perspective the 
classification may be utilized as a proxy, or if instead it ought to be 
disregarded. In other words, is the case of accommodating disabled 
employees more like that of English soccer hooligans with a 
predilection for violence, or like women of Jewish-European descent 
with a genetic predisposition to breast cancer? 
From a jurisprudential perspective, the paradigm of simple 
discrimination contrasted with redistribution reverberates with the 
philosophical scheme dividing formal (or corrective) justice from 
distributive (or material) justice. The first concept refers to the notion 
44. /d. at 311-14, 357. 
45. !d. at317. 
46. See Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 
53 DUKE L.J. 79, 103-08 (2003) [hereinafter Stein, Accommodations] (presenting and 
critiquing the accommodation cost studies in depth); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical 
Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1677-81 (2000) (same). 
May2004] Generalizing Disability 1385 
of treating similarly situated individuals in a similar manner,47 or what 
Schauer referred to as "treating like cases alike" (pp. 199-223). The 
second category, drawn from the social-justice province, advocates 
treating all individuals equally, whether or not they are in fact equal,48 
which Profiles described as "treating unlike cases alike" (pp. 199-223). 
Although the typical academic examination of the ADA does not 
overtly articulate the paradigm in these jurisprudential terms49 -
instead expressing itself in economic ones - adherence to this 
philosophical dichotomy is logically necessary. This is because, in 
order to conclude that ADA-compelled accommodations bring about 
something more than equality rather than remedying historical 
prejudice, one must first assume that the disabled are not equal in 
terms of relevant factors.50 Doing so requires a belief that 
47. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in 10 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 205, 243 (J.M. Robson ed., 1969) ("Fifthly, it is, by universal 
admission, inconsistent with justice to be partial; to show favour or preference to one person 
over another, in matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply."); HENRY 
SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 267 (1907) (noting that "the only sense in which 
justice requires a law to be equal is that its execution must affect equally all the individuals 
belonging to any of the classes specified in the law"). 
48. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302-3 (1971) (defining distributive 
justice generally as the theory that "[a]ll social primary goods- liberty and opportunity, 
income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored"); 
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 73-87, 129-52 (1992) (advancing Rawls's 
conception of distributive justice by exploring the dynamic interplay of equality and 
diversity). A few commentators have applied Rawlsian theory to people with disabilities. 
See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS 290 (Donald 
VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987) (maintaining that society ought to redistribute 
resources in the form of health care to disabled people whose functioning would be enabled 
with such resources); Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
599 (2000) (arguing that redistribution of material goods sufficient to make disabled people 
functional, and hence autonomous, is a moral obligation on society); Ronald Dworkin, What 
is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (suggesting that 
people with disabilities should receive wealth redistribution as part of a behind-the-veil 
insurance schema). 
49. A slightly confusing exception is Issacharoff & Nelson, who assert that the ADA's 
accommodation mandate begins from a "unique ... claim that differently situated persons 
should be treated differently," by which they mean that the ADA requires the treatment of 
disabled persons (who are different in a lesser sense) as nonetheless equal. Supra note 42, 
at 315. 
50. A few commentators take this point further by asserting that ADA-mandated 
reasonable accommodations are in fact a form of affirmative action. See, e.g., SAMUEL 
LEITER & WILLIAM M. LEITER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
POLICY: AN OVERVIEW AND SYNTHESIS 53 (2002) (asserting confluence between the 
provision of reasonable-accommodation and affirmative-action policies); Stephen F. Befort 
& Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court's 
Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 75 (1999) 
(arguing that because reasonable accommodation "is a concept alien to most 
antidiscrimination claims brought under Title VII," it "is, in essence, a form of affirmative 
action for disabled individuals"); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, 
Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1996) (disabled workers 
seeking accommodations "insist upon discrimination in their favor"). 
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accommodation costs are endogenously engendered due to the 
disabled's biological inability, rather than exogenously caused by 
socially contingent conditions. Conversely, if one views 
accommodation expenses as remedying unnecessary historical 
exclusion, then their provision levels an uneven playing field much in 
the same way as other antidiscrimination statutes.51 
Contrary to the prevailing perspective of inherent limitations 
restricting disabled participation, disability-studies scholars52 have long 
argued on behalf of a "social" or "minority" model of disability.53 
According to this framework, the physical environment, and the 
attitudes which form it, play a crucial role towards creating the 
"disability" classification. Thus, factors exogenous to a person's own 
impairments largely determine the extent to which a given disabled 
individual can participate in society.54 This notion is in stark contrast 
to the "medical model" of disability which, influencing the received 
wisdom, views a disabled person's limitations as inherently (and thus, 
morally and properly) excluding her from the mainstream. 55 
An early contribution to the social model of disability was made by 
Jacobus tenBroek, who argued that disabled peoples' functional 
51. For a prudential discussion of why employers, rather than society at large, ought to 
bear these costs, see Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 30. 
52. Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or 
feminist theory, with dedicated university departments. Gary L. Albrecht et al., The 
Formation of Disability Studies, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 1-12 (Gary L. 
Albrecht et al. eds., 2001). For discussion of how the discipline has moved from the margin 
to the mainstream, see SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 
(1998), and Catherine J. Kudlick, Disability History: Why We Need Another "Other," 108 
AM. HIST. REV. 763 (2003). 
53. As explained by one of the originators of the theory, the minority-rights model: 
is based on three major postulates: (1} the primary problems faced by disabled persons stem 
from social attitudes rather than from functional limitations; (2) all facets of the man-made 
environment are shaped or molded by public policy; and (3) in a democratic society, public 
policies represent prevailing public attitudes and values. 
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 
4. S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97, 105 (1994); see also id. at 101 ("[D]isability is 
attributed primarily to a disabling environment instead of bodily defects or deficiencies."). 
54. See, e.g., CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCf (1988) 
(tracing the legal, limiting, classification of disability); SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED 
BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECfiONS ON DISABILITY 35 (1996) (noting the 
difficulty in marking "the distinction between the biological reality of a disability and the 
social construction of a disability"); Amundson, supra note 39, at 110 (1992} (stating that "a 
handicap results from the interaction between a disability and an environment"); Richard K. 
Scotch, Making Change: the ADA and an Instrument of Social Reform, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES, supra note 28, at 275 ("[A] social model of disability that conceptualizes 
disability as a social construction that is the result of interaction between physical or mental 
impairment and the social environment."). 
55. See generally Kenny Fries, Introduction to STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY 
EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that "this view of 
disability ... puts the blame squarely on the individual."}. 
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impairments were contingent on "a variety of considerations related to 
public attitudes," most of which were "quite erroneous and 
misconceived. "56 A more contemporary expression of the social model 
of disability, and one applied to the ADA, has been proffered by Anita 
Silvers.57 Silvers argues that the social framework traces the source of 
disabled peoples' relative disadvantage to the existence of a hostile 
environment that is "artificial and remediable" as opposed to "natural 
and immutable.''58 According to her, the ADA seeks to dislodge 
traditional practices by sanctioning intervention into existing social 
constructs through questioning an environment that unnecessarily 
disadvantages people with disabilities.59 She therefore concludes that it 
is erroneous to characterize the provision of a reasonable 
accommodation "as advantaging the individual for whom it is made."60 
Instead, Silvers explains that from the viewpoint of a person mobilized 
in a wheelchair, disablement is experienced by lack of access to 
workplaces, educational programs, medical services, and other areas 
otherwise open to the public. 
I generally agree with the disability studies perspective that the 
ADA is an appropriate antidiscrimination device because it remedies 
avoidable exclusion. At the same time, the strongest version of the 
argument also has limitations. Not all exclusion from the workplace is 
artificial; some barriers are both natural and necessary. Moreover, 
there are workers with disabilities whose impairments even reasonable 
(or super-reasonable) accommodations will be unable to ameliorate.61 
The issue is where to draw the line between artificial and inherent 
exclusion. Although an exhaustive discussion is well beyond the 
boundaries of this Review,62 it bears noting that one way to 
differentiate these concepts is by assessing the physically constructed 
environment through Universal Design principles.63 This is an 
architectural concept that seeks to create "environments and products 
56. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 
54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966). 
57. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (1998). 
58. /d. at 75. 
59. /d. at 124. 
60. /d. at 132. 
61. For an in-depth discussion, see Stein, Accommodations, supra note 46, at 90-109. As 
an aside, in passing the ADA Congress also agreed with this perspective. See Michael Ashley 
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1151 (2004). 
62. I attempt to do so in Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 30. 
63. See generally Robert Imrie, Inclusive Design: Designing and Developing Accessible 
Environments (2001). 
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that are usable by all people to the greatest extent possible. "64 From a 
disability rights perspective, a clear example of artificial exclusion 
caused by non-Universal Design are the courthouse stairs that 
precipitated the recent Supreme Court case Tennessee v. Lane.65 The 
Justices never discussed Universal Design in ruling that States did not 
have sovereign immunity to suits seeking court access under Title II of 
the ADA. Nevertheless, in order to find that people with disabilities 
had been subject to unequal admittance to judicial services, the Court 
had to believe that this physical barrier was unnecessarily 
exclusionary; to hold otherwise (as did the Chief Justice in dissent) is 
to view the exclusion of people with disabilities as opportune, if 
unfortunate.66 If allowed to add her own concurring opinion, a 
disability rights advocate would point out that there is no intrinsic 
reason for constructing a public building in a manner that as a 
practical matter excludes members of the public, including those with 
disabilities.67 Hence, the provision of reasonable accommodation to 
the courthouse ameliorates an insensitive and unnecessarily 
exclusionary social construction of the physical environment.68 
Finally, it bears noting that arguments similar to those now used by 
scholars to distinguish disability-related accommodations from more 
traditional antidiscrimination remedies, parallel assertions previously 
made against equalizing measures for women and for African 
Americans.69 The prevailing social convention for most of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries held that women were physically 
less capable than men.70 In consequence, women were excluded from 
occupational opportunity on the basis of unfounded stereotypical 
assumptions.71 Similarly, the manner in which prevailing wisdom 
64. R. Mace et a!., Accessible Environments: Toward Universal Design, in DESIGN 
INTERVENTIONS: TOWARDS A MORE HUMANE ARCHITECfURE 156 (Wolfgang Prieser et 
a!. eds., 1991). 
65. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). 
66. /d.; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001) (state actors 
"could quite hardheadedly - and perhaps hardheartedly" exclude disabled persons from 
employment opportunities) (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
67. Other possibly excluded individuals include the (nondisabled) elderly and very 
young, as well as people with orthopedic impairments, physical injuries and limitations, and 
obesity. 
68. Admittedly less obvious is the related impact that changes in physical design have in 
ameliorating exclusionary methods of job structuring and administration. 
69. Ironically, while these selfsame scholars uniformly and rigorously adhere to their 
position about disability, they would most likely be greatly offended by anyone expressing a 
parallel but equally retrogressive view about race or sex. 
70. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908) (stating as a given that 
"woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions" which "place her at 
a disadvantage" relative to man with whom "she is not an equal competitor"). 
71. See generally JULIE NOVOKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECfiNG WOMEN: 
GENDER, LAW, AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 131-82 
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distinguishes the treatment of the disabled from that of other 
protected groups by conceiving of disability as a biologically 
compelled reality, rather than as a contingent social construct, echoes 
the historical treatment of race.72 In so doing, these scholars similarly 
drape an issue of adaptable and variable social construction in the 
guise of fixed and scientific veracity.73 
CONCLUSION 
Profiles provides a refreshing re-interpretation of decisionmaking 
based on sustainable classifications. Schauer argues that the use of 
generalizations is an inevitable process in a complex society, as well as 
a useful tool in mediating social reality, because generalizations are 
often more accurate and efficient than particularized decisionmaking. 
As a result, uniform determinations arising from the use of statistically 
sustainable categories appear fairer to the general public. Nonetheless, 
a prominent exception to the morality of decisionmaking based on 
broad classifications are instances where the sustainable empirical 
facts are themselves by-products of past discrimination against those 
groups. Although legal scholars assert that workers with disabilities 
are less economically viable than their peers, and that providing them 
workplace accommodations raises them above an equality 
equilibrium, this Review has offered some thoughts as to a contrary 
account. 
(2001) (describing the ascendancy of regulation precluding women's workplace 
participation). 
72. See generally Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in 
the Nineteenth·Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social 
Construction of Race, in MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW 101, 102 (Kevin R. Johnson 
ed., 2003). 
73. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30-72 (1981) (describing 
how scientific thought has been historically misused to influence people into mistakenly 
believing that blacks were intellectually inferior). 
